
Vendor Bank Account Change Fraud: 7 Controls for 2026
Vendor bank account change fraud happens when a criminal poses as one of your suppliers and asks you to pay a real invoice into a "new" bank account they control. The most effective defense is not another tool but one rule applied every time: no change to vendor banking details is approved by email alone, and every change is confirmed by phone using a number you already had on file.
This guide covers how the scheme works, the red flags, seven controls to put in place before year-end payment runs, and what to do if the money has already left. It is written for owners and managers who run accounts payable themselves or oversee the people who do.
What is vendor bank account change fraud?
It is one of the most common forms of business email compromise (BEC). It does not break into your bank or your accounting software. It exploits your payment process: a believable email, a real invoice and someone under pressure to pay on time.
The losses are large. The FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center 2025 annual report lists business email compromise as the second-costliest crime type, with $3,046,598,558 in reported losses, behind only investment fraud. Overall, IC3 received 1,008,597 complaints and about $20.9 billion in reported losses in 2025. Those are only the cases people reported.
How does a fake vendor bank change scam work?
- Access or impersonation. The attacker compromises the vendor's mailbox, yours, or both, or registers a lookalike domain one character off from the real one.
- Reconnaissance. They read real threads to learn amounts, due dates, names and writing style.
- Timing. They wait for a large invoice or a payment cutoff and send the "we've changed banks" notice right before payment.
- Pressure. The message asks for speed or discretion, or says the phone lines are down.
- Late discovery. Days or weeks later the real vendor asks why they haven't been paid. By then the funds have usually moved on.
The invoice is often genuine. The amount, PO number and logo are right; only the account is wrong. That is why "the invoice looks fine" is not a control.
Red flags in a vendor bank account change request
- The change arrives by email, attached to or just ahead of an open invoice.
- The new bank, its location or the account holder name doesn't match the vendor's legal name.
- The sender domain is close but not identical, or the reply-to address differs from the sender.
- You are asked to hurry, keep it confidential or avoid calling.
- The email includes a new phone number "for questions."
- The tone, greeting or signature is off compared with your usual contact.
How to verify a vendor bank account change: 7 controls
These work whether you have one bookkeeper or a full AP team. What matters is whether they live in someone's memory or in your system.
1. A written policy: no banking change by email alone
Put it in writing and tell your vendors, so a verification call reads as standard practice rather than distrust. Apply it to every vendor, including long-standing ones; they are the ones attackers impersonate.
2. Call back on a number you already have
The FBI's guidance is to confirm fund transfer requests by phone using previously known numbers, never the number in the email asking for the change. Pull the number from the vendor onboarding form or contract, and log who you spoke with.
3. Segregation of duties
The person who edits vendor master data should not be the person who approves or releases payments. It is an old control, and it is still one of the cheapest to put in place.
4. A cooling-off period for new accounts
Hold the first payment to a newly changed account for a set number of business days, or require a second approver. Urgency is the attacker's main lever, and a fixed rule removes it.
5. Match the account holder to the legal entity
Before activating new details, confirm that the account holder matches the vendor's legal name and tax ID. If your bank's portal shows the beneficiary name when you add a payee, treat it as a real check, not a formality.
6. Automatic alerts on banking changes
Every change to banking details should notify the finance lead and, ideally, the vendor contact through a channel other than email. If the vendor didn't request it, they find out immediately.
7. An audit trail and a monthly review
Record who requested the change, who verified it, which number was called and who approved it. A 15-minute monthly review of changed accounts catches both mistakes and fraud.
Manual controls vs. controls built into your AP workflow
| Control | Manual | Built into the system |
|---|---|---|
| Callback verification | Relies on someone remembering on a busy day | The change stays locked until the call is logged |
| Segregation of duties | Easy to bypass when someone is out | Role permissions: editors cannot approve |
| Cooling-off period | Skipped during month-end crunch | New accounts are excluded from payment batches until the hold ends |
| Change alerts | Missing or late | Instant notice to finance and the vendor |
| Audit trail | Incomplete spreadsheets | Automatic, tamper-resistant change history |
The trade-off is real: built-in controls add friction, and some legitimate payments will wait a few days. For most businesses that cost is far smaller than a single diverted wire. If vendor data, approvals and payments sit in separate tools, a custom approvals and payments workflow can enforce all of this in one place.
What to do if you paid a fraudulent account
- Call your bank immediately and ask them to request a recall or freeze from the receiving bank. Have the date, amount, destination account and wire reference ready.
- File a complaint at ic3.gov as soon as possible. The IC3 report describes how its Recovery Asset Team works with financial institutions to try to freeze fraudulent transfers.
- Preserve evidence: full emails with headers, the invoice and the payment confirmation.
- Secure your mailboxes: reset passwords, turn on multi-factor authentication and look for forwarding rules you didn't create.
- Call the real vendor on a known number. Their email may be compromised too.
Common mistakes that let BEC payment fraud through
- Trusting the invoice. In this scheme the invoice is often real.
- Calling the number in the email. The attacker answers that phone.
- Making holiday exceptions. Black Friday and year-end bring large payment runs and thin staffing, which is exactly when the rule must hold.
- Training only finance. Purchasing, executives and assistants receive these requests too, including the "urgent wire from the CEO" variant.
- Ignoring your own mailbox. If your account is compromised, the attacker can reply to vendors as you.
Year-end checklist for accounts payable
- The "no banking change by email alone" policy is written and shared with finance, purchasing and vendors.
- Every vendor has a verified phone number on file.
- People who edit banking details cannot approve payments.
- New accounts have a hold or a second approval before the first payment.
- Company email has multi-factor authentication enabled.
- A change log exists and someone reviews it monthly.
If you want a second opinion on where your payment process is exposed, tell us how your AP workflow runs today and we'll tell you what is worth automating and what a clear policy already solves.
Frequently asked questions
How do I verify a vendor's bank account change?
Call the vendor using a phone number you already had on file, not one from the request, and confirm with your usual contact. Document the call, then have a different person approve the change before any payment goes out.
Can I get my money back after paying a fake invoice?
It is not guaranteed. Recovery depends mostly on speed and on whether the funds are still in the receiving account, so call your bank right away and file at ic3.gov.
Who is liable when a vendor's email was hacked?
It depends on your contracts, the facts and local law, and it is often disputed. A documented verification process puts you in a much stronger position, so talk to your attorney and insurer if it happens.
What is BEC fraud?
Business email compromise is fraud in which criminals impersonate or take over the email of a vendor, customer or executive to redirect payments. Vendor bank changes and fake CEO wire requests are two of the most frequent variants.
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